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Donna Haraway’s (1991) vision of a post-gender cyborg has (re)sparked 
feminist interest in reclaiming patriarchal technological tools as a source of 
liberation from gender oppression. These utopian, cyborgian dreams of the 
dissolution of body and gender dualisms however, are flawed. This failing is 
founded on Haraway’s underestimation of the gender-influenced relationship 
between: the historical legacies of the cyborg; linguistic metaphors and 
symbols; and the lived subjective technological experiences of embodied 
materiality. Consequently, despite Haraway’s fantastical claims of the cyborg 
being able to transgress traditional hierarchical bodily-based binaries, this 
cyborg vision is distinctly modern in a nostalgic, linear, and utopian 
construction. As a result, these idealistic cyborg visions can be linked 
paradoxically to patriarchal discourses; the Cartesian philosophies of Christian 
religion; and the posthuman prophetical desires of the Extropian transhuman 
collective (Extropy Institute, 2003a, 2003b; More, 2003), such as featured in the 
works of Hans Moravec (1988) and Kevin Warwick (2002). 
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Introduction 
 
 
By defining our everyday realities, metaphors can prevent conflicting or contradictory 
understandings to socially accepted definitions (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Socio-
cultural change however, serves to alter and change these metaphorical conceptions to 
new sociological knowledges. Accordingly, Donna Haraway (1997, 1995, 1992a, 
1992b, 1992c, 1991) asserts the intimate relationships occurring between the 
traditional dualistic structures of organisms and technology, has altered human 
ontology to cyborg ontology. The historical metaphors of the body and gender are 
pervasive however, as “the fact that they are metaphorical never occurs to most of us” 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 26). Therefore, despite technological innovations, these 
oppressive legacies can continue to influence the framework of ‘new’ understandings. 
In this fashion, cyborg militaristic origins have been influential upon the contemporary 
cyborg and thus, paradoxically, Haraway’s cyborg can both overcome and reinforce 
bodily-based dichotomies. As a result, the Harawayian dream of a cyborg utopian and 
post-gender social reality connects to modernity’s humanist stories of linear progress 
and continual improvement. In turn, these visions are also repeated in the 
trans/posthumanism of the Extropians (Extropy Institute, 2003a, 2003b; More, 2003). 
These utopian ideals overlook the material and subjective lived experiences with 
cyborg technology, where patriarchal cultural legacies and Cartesian Christian values 
continue to be exercised through and on cyborg bodies. As a result, this critical 
engagement with the cyborg is concerned with Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) formulation of 
embodiment as an omnipresent lived experience of “being-in-the-word” (Heidegger 
1962: 33, 65), and with the relationship between embodiment, technology, and gender, 
as examined by feminist theorists such as Balsamo (1996, 1988), Braidotti (2002, 
1996), and Springer (1996, 1994). Through such understandings, the concrete reality 
of lived, material embodiment and the accompanying embedded character of gender, 
highlight that while the cyborg can challenge dualisms, this confrontation should not be 
simply considered a post-gender utopia. 
 
 
The Cyborg 
 
 
Origins 
 
 
The word ‘cyborg’ (cybernetic organism) was originally coined in 1960 by Manfred 
Clynes and Nathan Kline (1960). As engineers working for the United States’ N.A.S.A. 
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration) program, Clynes and Kline’s (1960) 
cyborg vision is a human/machine hybrid that modifies humans for space, rather than 
creating extraterrestrial human-friendly environments. Therefore, the cyborg is a 
liberating mechanism from human environments via a “self-regulating man-machine 
system” (Clynes and Kline, 1960: 30). Considered to be more flexible than human 
organisms alone, this hardware-based ‘man-machine’ system is incorporated into a 
space suit that alters various bodily functions (Tomas, 1995; Clynes and Kline, 1960). 
Clynes and Kline (1960) cyborg vision is therefore a ‘superman’ dream of 
‘postbiological evolution’, which fuses space exploration with medicine, implants, and 
electronic modification to create human dependence, rather than interdependence, on 
machines (Gray, 2002; Tomas, 1995). 
 
These scientific-militaristic origins of the cyborg dreamed of a future where, similarly to 
the Christian soul, annoying restrictions of embodiment and bodily constraint could be 
overcome via technologically influenced medical developments (Kunzru, 1997). As a 
creation of both science and science fiction, these militaristic applications of the cyborg 
as overcoming the ‘natural weaknesses’ of the body are distinctly Cartesian in viewing 
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the body as a manipulative and disposable mechanism of ‘meat’. Consequently, cyborg 
origins offer little to developing human ontology beyond Western patriarchal and 
Cartesian-Christian conceptualisations of hierarchical duality.  
 
 
 
Haraway’s Contemporary Cyborg 
 
 
For Donna Haraway (b.1944), this cyborg ideology has been surpassed with a 
contemporary definition. Importantly, this new definition is based on an “ironic political 
myth”, where the contemporary cyborg is the “illegitimate offspring” of the “inessential” 
cyborg militaristic “father” (Haraway, 1991: 151). This illegitimacy is based on the 
cyborg’s innate ability to erase hierarchical and traditional dichotomies, which ignores 
genealogical history (Haraway, 1991). Consequently, the postmodern children of 
modernity’s real (Freud) or symbolic (Lacan) cyborg father, break ancestral legacies 
(the Oedipal socius), of the family. This allows the cyborg to “set aside the 
Enlightenment figures of coherent and masterful subjectivity” (Haraway, 1992a: 87) 
unified in ‘nature’, and question those oppositions that have been foundational in how 
humans think of themselves and the surrounding world. Therefore, the cyborg is not 
simply the scientific-militaristic fusion of cybernetics and organisms but, by extension, a 
hybrid of other basic dualistic assumptions that affect the everyday self-
conceptualisations of the population. Cyborgs thereby challenge not only the 
organic/technological distinction, but other scared dualisms of modernity via their 
singular or multiple boundary crossings, such as human/animal, physical/non-physical, 
mind/body, public/private, nature/culture, active/passive, right/wrong, reason/emotion, 
primitive/civilized, whole (total)/part (partial), maker (God)/made (man), truth 
(reality)/illusion (fiction), and male/female (Kunzru, 1997; Balsamo, 1996; Haraway, 
1991). These fusions create family ties between previously distinct categorisations: “I 
need my sibling species [such as the OncoMouse™, a transgenic animal incorporating 
human genetic material] to get me through this life story; our bodies share substance; 
we are kin” (Haraway, 1997: 120, 1995: xi-xii)1. As a result, technological figures are 
“both us and not-us” (Haraway 1997: 82), in a “family [that] is a mess” (Haraway, 1997: 
121). Hence, by challenging the established socius with singular or multiple hybrid 
fusions, the cyborg can become a tool of empowerment that confronts basic 
modernistic and oppressive socio-cultural dualistic assumptions (Haraway, 1992b). 
This type of cyborg therefore, is ontologically different to Clynes and Kline’s (1960) 
proposed cyborg ontology. On the other hand, like Clynes and Kline’s (1960) cyborg, 
Haraway’s cyborg ontology is enabled through the knowledge generated by, and the 
interventions of, technology. 
 
Importantly however, these cyborg (technoscientific) figures are not simply material 
entities, but embodied “material-semiotic actors” (Haraway 1997: 11). These material-
semiotic actors are constructed and marked by understandings and practices of the 
body, technology, and linguistics, as founded on situated knowledges (Haraway 1997, 
1992b, 1991, 1989). This means cyborg bodies are “compounds of hybrid techno-
organic embodiment and textuality”, where “text, machine, body, and metaphor” fuse 
(Haraway 1991: 212; 1989: 16). In this fashion, Haraway draws attention to the 
materiality of being, as well as the embodied knowledges, which construct the body. 
 
Therefore, the collapsing of modern distinctions such as man/woman in the material-
semiotic cyborg exposes traditional assemblages to be active and flexible social 
constructions, which can be questioned and reconstructed (Haraway, 1992b). 
Elements crucial to the cyborg, such as contradiction and imitation, are thereby part of 
gender. As a result, the complex set of oppressive fictions that constrain both men and 
women (Cornell 1992) can be, in the vein of Butler (1990), transformed beyond the 
confines and limitations of sex. It is therefore important to use cyborg imagery to shift 
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and challenge traditional representations and understandings of women (Penley, 1991 
in Howell, 1995; Haraway, 1991).  
 
Taking pleasure in these boundary transgressions of the cyborg, Haraway (1991: 150, 
emphasis added) blurs reality/fiction by asserting “the cyborg is a creature in a post-
gender world”, while proposing “we are cyborgs”. In this fashion, Haraway (1991: 181) 
understands the importance of the cyborg as a “utopian dream of the hope for a 
monstrous world without gender”, meaning the cyborg should be embraced in “the 
promises of monsters” (Haraway, 1992b: 295). Nevertheless, despite Haraway’s (1991) 
acknowledgement of the utopian and dystopic past, present, and future potentials of 
technoscience; “bodies are maps of power and identity. Cyborgs are no exception” 
(Haraway, 1991: 180); she focuses on a cyborg utopia2 “as an imaginative resource 
suggesting some very fruitful couplings” (Haraway, 1991: 153). 
 
Similarly to Firestone’s utopian social vision of a techno-based post-gender reality that 
is free from biologically-based oppression (Braidotti, 2002; Firestone, 1970), Haraway 
(1991) presents the cyborg as (another) liberating source to escape gender 
stereotypes (Dixon, 2003; Balsamo, 1988). In this way, desire for gender reconstruction 
through dichotomist transgression is nothing more than a utopian dream, where the 
future reality will be more desirable than the present (Horner, 2001). Hence, such 
cyborg concepts are an escapist futuristic solution from the dissatisfaction with “the 
inadequacies and injustices of [contemporary] human life” (Springer, 1994: 163), which 
reconciles the self/other in a Lacanian Imaginary realm (Springer, 1994). In this 
fashion, the blurring of reality/imagination (Haraway, 1991) is a repetition of old feminist 
stories that reduces the depths of the: materiality of the concrete and embodied lived 
experience; structural embedded nature of gender; and the rhizomatous role of 
technology, which is creating ‘real’ oppression. Thus, as “the body is our general 
medium for having a world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 146), our ‘real’ embodied 
experiences are cyborg ‘facts’, that should remain to be potently significant for cyborg 
anthropology.  
 
The powerful lived experience of the body and its intentionality is seen in the phantom-
limb syndrome, where the absent limb of an amputee can be ambivalently 
(omni)present in a dual ontology of presence/absence (Merleau-Ponty 1962). 
Consequently, our understandings of the body should not only be conceived as 
transcending the flesh, but also dependent on our familiar lived experiences of the 
body. In other words, the embodiment of being-in-the-world is vital for the development 
and understanding of agency as experienced in ‘reality’. As a result, the concrete 
(cyborg) body continues to be a site of oppression; “an interface … a field of 
intersecting material and symbolic forces; it is a surface were multiple codes … are 
inscribed” (Braidotti, 2002: 25). In this fashion, cyborgs are not simply the new ontology 
or new embodied ‘flesh’ envisioned by Haraway (in Kunzru 1997), as sexualised 
markings on the (cyborg) body (Foster 1996) increase, rather than decrease, the 
gender divide. Furthermore, the immediate and everyday experience of the lived 
physical body (Leib) within a common life-world (Lebenswelt) (Merleau-Ponty 1962), 
continues to reassert the need to be aware, and to respect, the present social 
construction of human ontology as gendered3. In turn, the interrelation between 
materiality and discourse are important in the production of ‘reality’. Therefore, while 
Haraway acknowledges the social influences on material-semiotic actors, she focuses 
on cyborg post-gender ‘fiction’ at the expense of cyborg-gendered realities. Thus, it is 
important to consider what this ‘reality’ actually means for the lived experiences of 
cyborg bodies. 
 
An example of this ‘real’ cyborg experience is the dominant transition of the 
androgynous human body to an enhanced masculine male cyborg body. This 
reassertion of gender differences and dualisms occurs through the technoscientific 
knowledges of military warfare, biomedicine (cyborg sex), and the popular icons of 
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action figure toys and science fiction stories (Gray, 2000). By repeating the fantasies of 
modernity, this means women have become (or are again) the main losers (Braidotti, 
1996) in a cyborgian ‘hypermasculinity’. In this vein, “cyborg images reproduce limiting, 
not liberating, gender stereotypes” (Balsamo, 1988: 341). As a result, the futuristic and 
untroubled embracement of cyborg technologies is a technologically-based idealistic 
and whimsical reconciliation of dualisms (Horner, 2001), which does not erase sexual 
difference and otherness (Braidotti, 2002). Thus, gender dissolution requires more than 
acknowledging and figuratively reconstructing dualistic social constructions through 
machines, as “the question is not cyborg possibilities in and of themselves, but how the 
cyborg has been constructed by patriarchal discourse” (Rose in Dery, 1994: 217).  
 
These understandings reveal that technoscience and the material-semiotic cyborg 
continue to: uphold modernism’s patriarchal stories and desires of domination, control, 
and progress; (re)create oppressive dualistic categories; and/or uphold the precious 
sanctity of humanity and Christian Cartesian philosophy. This suggests that while it is 
permissible to dissolve some dualistic assumptions (such as human/machine), other 
dichotomies are guarded ferociously and/or subtly (re)produced (such as man/woman). 
Therefore, while cyborgs can create new possibilities, the structural inequalities and 
dualisms of patriarchy can also be intensified (Braidotti, 1996). Significantly, in her 
utopian post-gender cyborg fantasy, Haraway’s cyborg connects to and intensifies the 
linear and paradisaical vision of modernism and Cartesianism. This can be explicitly 
demonstrated through the connection of Haraway’s cyborg to the transhumanist and 
posthuman prophecies of the Extropians. 
 
 
Transhumanism, Posthumanism, Extropians, and Haraway’s Cyborg 
 
 
Extropians are a loose collective of transhumanists who, although subscribing to 
individual political doctrines, optimistically believe that technological advances are 
challenging human biological limitations and socio-historical certainties (Extropy 
Institute, 2003a). Thus, values shared by Extropians, seen in ‘The Principles of 
Extropy’ (More, 2003), are viewed as achievable through different technological-based 
mechanisms (Extropy Institute, 2003b). These principles, consisting of: perpetual 
progress; self-transformation; practical optimism; intelligent technology; open society; 
self direction; and rational thinking (More, 2003), are founded on humanist ideals of 
innate human goodness and rationality, and a desire for progress, activity, and self-
improvement (Extropy Institute, 2003b). At the same time, these principles also go 
beyond humanism in a technological imperative for species evolution (Extropy Institute, 
2003b). Consequently, transhumanist improvements to humanity will surpass the 
annoying restrictions of biological and organic human evolution to facilitate a 
posthuman condition (Clarke, 2002), of variant ‘postbiologicalism’. 
 
For the Extropian Hans Moravec (1988), such evolutionary strategies will imperatively 
occur through the technological separation of the mind and body. In Moravec’s (1988) 
post-biological future of artificial intelligence, it will no longer be wise to remain 
consciously connected to the human body due to the evolutionary pace of machines 
(Springer, 1996): “we have very little choice, if our culture is to remain viable” 
(Moravec, 1988: 100). This externalisation process involves the transferral of the mind 
into a machine-based system, such as a robot or computer disc. The result of mind 
transmigration is an immortal and potentially multiple human existence without a body 
(Dery, 1996; Moravec, 1988), thus rendering the body obsolete (Foster, 1996; 
Springer, 1996). Correspondingly, human existence becomes one of personal freedom, 
where technology allows Cartesian-Christian liberation of the conscious soul from the 
bondage of the body (Moravec, 1988). This postbiological future is further elaborated 
by the Extropy Institute (2003b: http://www.extropy.org/faq.htm, accessed 08/07/04), 
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who believe sex and gender will become mutable, allowing the possibility of 
“negsexuals, solosexuals, technosexuals, postsexuals, multisexuals [,and] VRsexuals”. 
 
These evolutionary and optimistic beliefs in the technological inevitability to improve 
bodily imperfections are additionally explored in the cybernetic experiments of Kevin 
Warwick, who has been widely referred to as “Professor Cyborg” (Brown, 1999: 
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/1999/10/20/cyborg/, accessed 11/08/04). In 1998, 
Warwick (2002) implanted a silicon chip transponder into his left arm. This chip allowed 
his body movements to be electronically detected and, like a remote control, activate 
numerous electronic items, such as doors, computers, and lights via human/chip 
locality (Warwick, 2002). Additionally, this electronic detection facilitated Warwick’s 
movements to be remotely monitored and recorded, allowing the creation of a 
computer log on his habitual movements. Despite this monitoring, however, Warwick 
“wasn’t in the slightest worried or even upset about the computer monitoring”, as it 
facilitated a positive gain of extras for his life, “rather than losing something” (Warwick, 
2002: 84).  
 
Like Moravec (1988), Warwick (2002) advocates implant technologies on an 
evolutionary, convenience, and imperative basis, where the enhancement of the 
human body will improve communications, increase information absorption, and 
supersede the body’s physical limitations for new found human freedoms: "The human 
body and the human brain are fine as far as being a human is concerned; but they are 
very, very restricted and limited when we look into the future" (Warwick in Brown, 1999: 
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/1999/10/20/cyborg/, accessed 11/08/04). Therefore, 
the posthuman Extropian imagination exhibits a literal desire and need to become a 
machine through bodily transcendence (Horner, 2001; Foster, 1996). In this vein, the 
Extropian cyborg embraces the original programme of Clynes and Kline (1960), where 
the restrictions of embodiment and organic fragility are exceeded (Kunzru, 1997). This 
postbiological future of human evolution creates a higher form of being that is beyond 
mortality; facilitated by radically transforming the definition of ‘human’ through the 
technological imperatives of ‘downloading’ and ‘nano-medicine’ (Horner, 2001; Dery, 
1996). Thus, these techno-evolution stories exhibit the desire to achieve immortality by 
denying the body and reflecting repulsion for, and ultimate control over, the least 
manageable and most vulnerable life event – death (Zuboff, 1988). This transcendental 
program reflects religious doctrine, where the mind transcends the ‘dead’ body in the 
quest for eternal life. This vertical accession in the return to paradise ignores the body, 
and treats it as expendable (Dery, 1996; Springer, 1996).  
 
Moreover, while the Extropian Principle of ‘Open Society’ asserts Extropians are not 
utopian and avoid perfection through “openness to improvement” and “appreciating the 
diversity in values, lifestyle preferences, and approaches to solving problems” (More, 
2003: http://www.extropy.org/principles.htm, accessed 08/07/04), their desire for 
rational progress and enhancement (re)creates a philosophical regression to 
hierarchical Cartesian divisionism. By (re)creating this split between reason/emotion 
and the “body-species” of us/them (Stelarc, 1998: 116, 118), an inferior “subspecies” 
emerges (Warwick, 2002: 157). Hence, individuals who do not choose to mutate their 
bodies and sexuality are viewed as “plain ole’ sexuals who remain nostalgic of the 20th 
Century” (Extropy Institute, 2003b: http://www.extropy.org/faq.htm, accessed 08/07/04). 
As a result, Extropians paradoxically maintain nostalgia for the phallogocentric legacy 
of patriarchal control and power by creating a hierarchical dualistic system based on 
difference; separating the “technological elites” (the ‘haves’; those who mutate) from 
the “technopeasants” (the ‘have-nots’; those who remain immutable) (Gandy, 1989: 
62): 
 
 … I put forward a case that in the future, becoming a cyborg, with the help of 
implants, would give individuals much greater powers than those who remained 
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human … [Those who remain human] would become part of the subspecies human 
race. (Warwick, 2002: 157) 
  
Technology thus becomes the contemporary saviour that overcomes human biological 
constraints and limitations imposed on us by an external superior being and/or 
transcendental g/God at birth. Essentially, this treats the body as a material, 
unnecessary, and objectified structure of accidental and manipulative nature, which 
can be abandoned and changed (Nayar, 2002). For Australian cybernetic performance 
artist and trans/posthuman Stelarc, this bodily objectification is supported by “Cartesian 
convention, personal convenience and neurophysiological design”, as “people operate 
merely as minds” (Stelarc, 1998: 117). In this sense, Extropians are technological 
determinists in believing “evolutionary progress” occurs through technology (More, 
2003: http://www.extropy.org/ principles.htm, accessed 08/07/04), rather than the 
Harawayian-cyborg co-evolution and equality of human/machine convergence (Gray, et 
al., 1995). Furthermore, by using technology to overcome the imperfections created by 
g/God, the Extropians replicate the position of evolutionary creator (God) and human 
saviour (Jesus), who lead the masses to a higher and better form of immortal life 
(heaven), by healing their fragility and sins (notably, located in the mortal body). As a 
result, Extropians are joined to Christian philosophy and Cartesian bodily-
objectification. Furthermore, Extropian desires for ‘Perpetual Progress’ suggest 
technologies will continue to positively improve the cyborg body (More, 2003), 
(re)producing, yet again, modernity’s stories of linear progress and improvement.  
 
Similarly, Haraway (1997: 44) blurs science/religion to celebrate escapist fantasies of 
salvation, where “the Eucharist of biotechnology” becomes a religion that leads to 
alternative and improved ways of cyborg being (McCormick, 2000). Importantly, the 
Eucharist is a strong Christian religious metaphor for transcendental spiritual flow. As 
the supreme sacrament, the Eucharist embodies a faith in divinity, redemption, the 
eternal life in heaven, and Christ Himself (Brumley, 1996). Additionally, religious faith is 
strengthened through the Eucharist, as it is considered the home of spiritual love 
(Brumley, 1996). Through her celebration of “the Eucharist of biotechnology”, Haraway 
(1997: 44) thus posits biotechnology as a loving and divine Jesus-figure that will forgive 
us for our Oedipal sins. By forgiving these Oedipal sins, the cyborg liberates to a higher 
form of spiritual and heavenly life, this being a post-gender utopia. Therefore, while 
Haraway (1991: 150) claims “the cyborg incarnation is outside salvation history” and 
hopes for “unity across race, gender, and class” (Haraway, 1991: 173), she also 
repeats stories of improvement and paradise in a genderless and utopian future 
(Haraway, 1991). This entwining of the symbols of Christian faith and the cyborg 
therefore exploits the cyborg/posthuman as an ideal transcendental “saviour-figure” 
(Tatman, 2003: 51), in spite of Haraway’s (1997: 132) criticisms of “Christian salvation 
history” and longings for “the Garden of Eden” (Haraway, 1991: 151). In this fashion, 
while the OncoMouse’s™ “promise is decidedly secular, she [sic] is a figure in the 
sense developed from Christian realism” (Haraway 1997: 79), such relations highlight 
the power of religious metaphors in the cyborg genealogy, including Haraway’s own 
conceptualisations. The semiotic stories of Christian salvation history and their role in 
patriarchal science are thereby continued by Haraway whom, by employing the same 
discourses, reinforces the dualistic structures she wishes to overcome. Therefore, the 
promise embodied in Jesus for “the union of humanity and divinity in a universal 
salvation narrative” (Haraway 1992a: 90), has become embodied in the cyborg. In this 
fashion, DuPont’s4 cyborgian “better things for better living” (in Haraway 1997: 9, 84), 
(re)creates the (un)filling promises of Christian union and salvation. 
 
Furthermore, in reference to Haraway’s (1991) ‘post-gender’ reality, this vision implicitly 
creates an Extropian subspecies split between gendered (dystopic) and non-gendered 
(utopian) bodies. While Extropian mutuable-gender acknowledges the pervasiveness of 
gender in Western society, Haraway only explicitly identifies a post-gender state as 
desirable. In this way, humans will surpass (or have surpassed), gender as we know it 
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or, at least, how it is presently conceptualised. Therefore, Haraway employs her own 
Extropian ideal of species evolution by challenging the ‘known’ gendered material and 
semiotic body through technology (cyborgs), in order to become ‘something other than’. 
In this fashion, Haraway agrees with Warwick (2002) that bodies are limited in their 
present (gendered) form. Hence, the nostalgic liberation envisaged by the differing, yet 
similar, Harawayian and Extropian techno-optimism, serves to (re)create the 
hierarchical and judgemental binaries of Cartesian Christian philosophy, Western 
cultural beliefs, and modernity (McCormick, 2000). As a result, these cyborg discourses 
use the objectified body in a program of a unified utopianism (Therrien, 1993, in Dery, 
1996), which involves the body being “subjected, used, transformed, [and] improved” 
(Foucault, 1979: 136) for a better quality of (cyborg) life. Thus, while the Extropian 
cyborg is ontologically different to Haraway’s cyborg, both cyborgs share salvation, 
utopian, and dualistic dreams.  
 
 
Patriarchy and Cyborg Containment Technologies 
 
 
As patriarchy has influenced technological development and design, cyborg 
technologies can also embrace a hierarchy that defines technological usage and 
application. Therefore, despite espousing on equality of participation, regulations and 
disciplinary techniques are placed upon different bodies (Green, 2001). This cyborg 
contempt for particular bodies is evident in the restriction and/or exclusion of certain 
bodies from virtual reality (VR) game systems (Green, 2001; Horner, 2001). This 
marginalisation occurs through warning signs, which provide little or no explanation for 
excluding bodies that deviate from the male (cyborg)-determined ‘norm’: 
 
Warning! Do not play this game if you: 
 Are less than 100cm tall; 
 Are pregnant or may be pregnant [potentially all women in modern constructionist 
paradigms]; 
 Are under the influence of alcohol or drugs; 
 Have high blood pressure or a heart aliment; 
 Have neck or spinal pain; 
 Have eye disease; 
 Need assistance walking; 
 Have experienced muscle twitches, loss of awareness while watching TV, 
playing video games or being exposed to strong light stimulation. (sign next to a 
virtual reality game system, in Green, 2001: 166, emphasis in original) 
 
Therefore, while VR is technologically advanced, it is philosophically regressive by 
differentiating between bodies and paying homage to Cartesian dualisms (Penny, 
1995). This highlights how cultural legacies affect who can and cannot ‘be’ cyborg, and 
who can and cannot reap the benefits of cyborg technologies (Gray, et. al., 1995). 
Hence, cyborgs are embedded in a socio-cultural temporality that continues to 
privilege male dominance and control (Penny, 1995), by making the male body “the 
standard in the game of [cyborg] signification” (Laqueur, 1990: 22): 
 
The philosophy of technology … has been articulated entirely from a masculinist 
perspective in terms that metaphorize and marginalize the feminine. In real social 
discourse, this claiming of technology has been reinforced by, and … encouraged, 
a male monopoly on technical expertise, diminishing or excluding the historical 
contributions of women to technological developments. (Tenhaaf in Penny, 1995: 
203) 
 
Cyborg utopianism also ignores the vast and real potential of cyborg technologies to 
be used against the wider population for control and surveillance, and thus create 
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“degrading cyborgs” (Gray, et al., 1995: 3). Therefore, like religion, technologies can 
be used as a “power mechanism” for the “few to dominate the many” (Therrien, 1993, 
in Dery, 1996: 169). This is evidenced in corporate, political, militaristic, and policing 
interests expressed in the surveillance potentialities of Warwick’s (2002) implantation 
experiments (Brown, 1999). Furthermore, Warwick’s (2002) subsequent implantation 
project, aimed at directly connecting the human nervous system to computer networks 
and ultimately between two people, was funded by, and used resources from, a variety 
of corporations. Warwick (2002: 141) however, fails to see the self-interests that may 
motivate business to contribute to his implantation experiments beyond the simplistic 
needs of promotion: “ … they generally want something in return. The easiest way to 
deal with this was by providing publicity for the company on the back of what we are 
doing”. 
 
As a result, problems with cyborg technologies can arise from unforeseen or unknown 
consequences that compromise concerns of privacy and protection. Hence, despite not 
being designed initially for surveillance, advanced technologies can increase 
bureaucratic power through an integration with other resources of disciplinary 
surveillance and control (Gandy, 1989). “Cyborg containment technologies” (Gray, 
2002: 36) thus create, through the threat of constant surveillance and observation, a 
self-regulated and self-disciplined population of normalised ‘docile’ bodies (Staples, 
1994; Foucault, 1979), as based upon existing socio-cultural structures. 
Correspondingly, a key issue in cyborg technologies is an understanding of the power 
relationships enabled by the militaristic C3I (command-control-communication-
intelligence), which creates cyborgs that are not inevitably or inherently liberating 
(Haraway in Gray, 2002). This issue is ignored by the techno-utopianism of the 
Extropians, though considered by Haraway (1997, 1995, 1992b, 1991). Therefore, in 
the paradoxical makeup of the cyborg, cyborg technologies can be the ultimate form of 
oppression, while also embracing the ethos of liberation (Haraway in Gray, 2002; Gray, 
2000). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The problem with Haraway’s (1991) formulation of a post-gender, utopian cyborg is an 
undervaluation of the influential power of the materially embodied experience, which is 
shaped by deeply embedded socio-cultural notions of gender. These legacies have 
resulted in cyborgs upholding the oppressive humanist narratives of Cartesianism, 
Christian religion, and modernity; while also challenging and (re)creating the same 
dualistic structures. Moreover, Haraway’s techno-based utopian fantasies repeat old 
feminist stories of liberation, where the cyborg is a ‘saviour-figure’ that rescues 
humanity. In this fashion, as the synonymic or metaphorical implications of language 
cannot be controlled or remade, Haraway cannot remove, restrict, nor contain the 
religious connotations of words. This is because, like the cyborg, words carry cultural 
baggage and symbolism. Consequently, the cyborg is a site of socio-cultural political 
contestation (Balsamo, 1988), meaning we should not be seduced by the idealistic and 
utopian post-gender cyborg. In our dreams for the future, the contemporary ‘reality’ 
should not be ignored at the expense of fantastical post-gender ‘imagery’, or through 
fears of essentialism. As Braidotti (2002: 25) asserts, “it takes more than machinery to 
alter patterns of thought”. Thus, while the cyborg can enable new ways of thinking 
about human ontology by “open[ing] up productive ways of thinking about subjectivity, 
gender, and the materiality of a physical body” (Balsamo, 1988: 343), cyborgs can also 
reassert the boundaries lost in a constructionist paradigm (Fuchs 1995). Thus, the 
multiplicity of cyborg possibilities should not be reduced to utopianism or the dystopic 
(Sofoulis, 2002), as mixing cyborg reality/fiction should not come at the expense of 
‘real’ embodied cyborg experiences. 
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NOTES 
 
1 The OncoMouse™ is a genetically engineered mouse who carries, in addition to its own 
genes, a human oncogene. This human oncogene predisposes the OncoMouse™ to develop 
breast cancers more quickly than its non-genetically engineered counterparts. Therefore, the 
OncoMouse™ is a (breast) cancer “tool-weapon” (Haraway 1992c: 39). 
2 It is acknowledged Haraway (1992b) later asserts the cyborg should not merely be conceived 
as utopian. Many of the themes presented in that paper however, are still relevant for later 
works. 
3 It is not the intent of this paper to engage with the critique of corporeal feminists on Merleau-
Ponty’s (1962) universality of the body and failure to acknowledge the temporal socio-cultural 
context/s.  
4 DuPont is the biotechnology company that ‘manufactures’ the OncoMouse™. 
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